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Abstract 
Inference is a major component in the understanding 
of hatural language by computer. Whether deductive or 
non-deductive, the primary problem of inference is 
efficiency. Humans process language very quickly, and 
so must an intelligent machine. Procedural 
representation of propositional data improves the 
efficiency of deductive inference by providing direction 
to the theorem-proving process, but sacrifices the 
flexibility available in declarative representations. 
Much of the inference necessary for language 
understanding is not goal-directed in the way that 
formal deduction is, instead, predictions are made from 
the current input, and future input is examined to see 
how it fits the predictions. This provides an even 
greater efficiency problem. The prediction process must 
be controlled so that only the useful predictions are 
made. High-level knowledge structures such as frames 
and scripts add direction to the inferencing process, 
but again flexibility is sacrificed. Current research 
involves integration of high-level structures to provide 
control for all aspects of inference while maintaining 
an acceptable level of flexibility. 
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I. Introduction 
When humans communicate in natur.al languages, much 
of the information they exchange is not explicit, but is 
inferred by the listener. For example, when we hear, 
"John is going to the store.•, some of the things we 
infer are: 
( 1) John is not now at the store. (2) John wants to buy something. 
( 3) He is using some mode of transportation. 
A computer program which understands natural language 
may have to perform any of the above ( and more) 
inferences in order to demonstrate that it has 
understood the sentence. For example, a future sentence 
may be "He is taking the bus." In order to know how this 
information fits the context, so that it can correctly 
answer the question, "How is he getting to the store?", 
the computer must infer (3). 
Natural language understanding is usually divided 
into three areas: syntax ( the grammatical relationship 
between words), semantics (the explicit meaning of 
words, phrases, and sentences), and inference (the 
discovery of implied meanings and relationships). 
Rieger, however, defines natural language comprehension 
as "the art of making explicit the meaning relationship 
among thoughts which are presumed to be meaningfully 
relatable." Note that this definition emphasizes 
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inference. To justify this emphasis on inference, 
consider the problem of pronoun resolution in: "John hit 
Bill. He went to the doctor." Syntactic clues for 
pronoun resolution are inadequate in this case, in fact, 
a purely syntactic rule might be "If a pronoun is the 
subject of a sentence, its referent is likely to be the 
subject of the previous sentence.", which is not the 
case here. Semantics offer no solution, since it is 
semantically valid for any human to go to the doctor. 
Only by inferring that someone who is hit is likely to 
be hurt, and that someone who is hurt is likely to see a 
doctor, can an understander correctly recognize "He" as 
"Bill". 
There are two basic approaches to inference in 
computer natural language systems. The formal approach 
involves deduction and uses predicate logic, sometimes 
represented procedurally, as its primary knowledge 
representation. There are many manifestations of the 
informal approach, each of which uses some type of 
declarative knowledge structure. As may be inferred 
from the examples above, natural language inference 
requires knowledge of two types: real-world knowledge of 
such things as the consequences of actions and the goals 
of characters, and contextual knowledge which is 
continuously augmented throughout a story or 
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conversation. 
The purposes of this paper are: 1) to examine the 
nature of the problem of inference in natural language 
communication, 2) to discuss some of the knowledge 
structures and how they are used for inference in 
natural language systems, and 3) to examine how the 
process of inferencing may be controlled to make it 
practical for computer systems. This will be done 
through an examination of the inference component of the 
following systems: SHRDLU [Winograd,1971], MARGIE 
[Schank and Rieger,1974], SAM [Cullingford,1981], GUS 
[Bobrow et. al.,1977], Ms. Malaprop [Charniak, 1978], 
PAM [Wilensky,1981], Rieger's commonsense algorithms 
[Rieger,1976], and BORIS [Lehnert et. al.,1983]. 
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I. SHRDLU 
In SHRDLU [Winograd, 1971], the user enters English 
commands and questions directed toward a robot whose job 
is to interpret the commands and perform them, and to 
answer the questions. The robot's domain is a table 
with a set of blocks of various colors and shapes: the 
commands involve movement of the blocks, and the 
questions are about the state of the blocks world. The 
system is a natural language system and not a robotics 
system. A real robot was never used in the 
demonstration of the system: instead, its movements were 
simulated on a video display. The main contributions of 
the system were its ability understand grammatical 
structures of almost unlimited complexity and the 
procedural representation of propositional data which 
gave its inference process more direction than previous 
deductive systems had. We are interested in the latter. 
1. Knowledge Representation -- Procedures 
In its limited domain (the blocks world), SHRDLU's 
inference is deductive (as opposed to predictive non-
deductive inference systems which we shall discuss 
later). The principal method of deduction before SHRDLU 
was the general deductive approach. In this approach, 
propositional information was stored in a LISP 
representation of the first order predicate calculus. 
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Processing involved the Robinson resolution algorithm, 
which is based on proof by contradiction. First, the 
negation of the proposition to be proved is taken. 
Known propositions are stored as disjunctions of simple 
predicates. At each stage of the proof, the systim 
searches the entire data base of known propositions for 
one which includes (as part of its disjunction) the 
negation of something included in the current 
proposition. When one is found, the negation and the 
portion of the current proposition cancel, and the 
resulting proposition is the new current proposition. 
This process is repeated until the cancellation leaves 
nothing, which means whatever might have come from 
assuming the proposition fals·e has been contradicted by 
some known proposition, so the proposition is proved. 
There are two advantages of such a general 
deductive system. First, if a proposition is provable 
from the known propositions, a proof will (eventually) 
be found. Second, the proof procedure is uniform and 
not dependent upon knowledge of proof techniques in a 
specific domain. However, these advantages can also be 
regarded as disadvantages in a practical natural 
language system. This is because the algorithm has no 
direction about how to go about proving the proposition, 
so it has to test all known propositions until it finds 
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one which is relevant. In doing inference in 
natural 
language understanding, we do not have the tim
e to go 
through such an exhaustive process. The way w
e 
determine the truth of propositions is by havi
ng some 
heuristic knowledge about how our propositiona
l 
knowledge may be used. 
This is the idea behind the inferencing scheme
 used 
in SHRDLU. Propositions are stored as procedu
res in a 
language called PLANNER [Hewitt,1969]. Each procedure
 
may include information on how to go about pro
ving the 
proposition, such as which other procedures sh
ould be 
tried in an at tempt to prove this one, and in 
what 
order. The propositions are written in a form
 similar 
to the predicate calculus, and as much or as l
ittle 
subject-dependent heuristic information can be added as 
the user desires. If he adds none, the system
 works 
with the full flexibility of a general deducti
ve system: 
but with more information about how to prove i
t, ·the 
system is more efficient. 
The calling of procedures by other procedures 
is 
goal-directed, that is, a general pattern-matc
her looks 
at the goal (specified as part of the procedure) and 
chooses any procedure which satisfies the goal
. In this 
way, it is not necessary to have all procedure
s know 
about the existence of others. However, it re
quires a 
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pattern-matching search similar to that of the 
resolution algorithm~ If, on the other hand, spe
cific 
procedures are recommended as the only ones to try
 in 
order to satisfy the goal of a given procedure, t
he 
exhaustive search is eliminated, but now the proc
edures 
have to know about other procedures. That is, th
e 
system involves a trade-off between efficiency an
d 
additivity. 
Some of the features of PLANNER can be seen in th
e 
following example. 
(DEFINE THEOREM EVALUATE 
( TH CONS E ( X Y ) 
(THGOAL (iTHESIS $?X)) 
(THOR 
(THGOAL (#LONG $?X) (THOSE CONTENTS-CHECK COUNTPAGES)) 
(THAND 
(THGOAL (#CONTAINS $?X $?Y)) 
(THGOAL (#ARGUMENT $?Y}) 
(THGOAL (#PERSUASIVE $?Y) (THTBF THTRUE)) ) ) ) ) 
Fi~st, note the punctuation 
11 # 11 and "$?". The "# 11 
indicates that what follows is a predicate name; 
the 
"?$" indicates a variable. Another punctuation mark":" 
is used to indicate an object, the value to which a 
variable might be bound. 
This is the procedural representation of the 
theorem "A thesis is acceptable if it is either lo
ng or 
it contains a persuasive argument 
11
• The name of the 
theorem is EVALUATE. Its variables are X and Y; 
Xis 
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the theorem to be tested; Y is used to hold something in 
the thesis which is tested to see if it a persuasive 
argument. THCONSE is the type of theorem -- this is a 
consequent theorem since we are trying to establish 
whether or not a given thesis is acceptable. There are 
two main subgoals. The first is to prove that X is a 
thesis: the second is to prove that either X is long or 
that X contains a persuasive argument. These are given 
as THGOAL. The first goal has the recommendation list 
CONTENTS-CHECK and COUNTPAGES, indicated by THUSE. This 
means that to establish the goal that the thesis is 
long, the procedures CONTENTS-CHECK (which presumably 
looks at the Table of Contents) and COUNTPAGES (which 
counts the pages) should be used in order. If this 
succeeds, it is not necessary to look for a persuasive 
argument, so THOR is an OR which does not check the 
second statement if the first one is true. If we do 
need to check for a persuasive argument, the theorem 
says we must first find something that the thesis 
contains, if this is found, see if it is an argument, 
and if so, try to prove that it is persuasive. Note 
that THAND only continues to the next statement if the 
previous one was true. The check for persuasiveness 
contains the recommendation (THTBF THTRUE). THTBF means 
try any theorem whose form satisfies the filter which 
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follows. THTRUE is the only filter used in SHRDLU, 
although a PLANNER user may define any filters he 
wishes. THTRUE is a predefined filter which any theorem 
matches. 
We stated the theorem which this procedure 
represents in declarative form above. In imperative 
form, the procedure may be stated: "In order to 
evaluate X for acceptability as a thesis, first show 
that Xis a thesis; then show that it is either long or 
that it contains a persuasive argument. To see if it is 
a thesis, look in the data base of simple assertions. 
To see if it is long, first check the table of contents, 
and if this fails, count the pages. If the thesis is 
not long, check to see if it has a persuasive argument. 
To do this, find something it contains, show that it is 
an argument, and show that it is persuasive using any 
theorem which might apply." 
Among PLANNER'S other features are THGO, THAMONG, 
THERASE, THASSERT, THANTE, and THFIND. THGO is a GOTO 
statement. THAMONG is like LISP MEMQ, succeeding if the 
value of the given variable is in the given list. 
THERASE removes assertions (which are declaratively 
represented simple predicates) from the data base; 
THASSERT adds assertions to the data base. THANTE is 
for declaring an ANTECEDENT theorem, which is used to 
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indicate that certain assertions should be added when 
certain facts are determined. For example, when we find 
that X drove a car somewhere, we may wish to assert that 
X is human, because this may be useful in proving other 
theorems. To do this, we could define an ANTECEDENT 
theorem as follows: 
( D EFPROP DR! VETHEOREM 
( TH ANTE X ( DROVE $ ?X $ ?Y) 
( THASSERT ( HUMAN $ ?X))) THEOREM). 
THFIND is used to find objects or assertions satisfying 
a given condition. This is useful in the blocks world, 
where the system might, for example, wish to find all 
the red blocks. It could use the following: 
(THFIND ALL $?X (X) 
( THGOAL ( BLOCK $ ?X ) ) 
( THGOAL ( COLOR $ ?X RED} } ) • 
2. Processing 
SHRDLU, as noted above, receives commands and 
questions in English. The syntactic and semantic 
portions of the system process the commands or questions 
into PLANNER statements. For example, the command "Pick 
up the block and put it into the box." could be 
expressed in PLANNER as: 
( THAND ( THGOAL ( #PICKUP : BLOCK23}} 
( THGOAL ( #PUTIN : BLOCK23 : B0X7))) 
assuming that semantic analysis has correctly identified 
"the block" as :BLOCK23 and "the box" as :BOX7. 
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and :PUTIN are procedures which indicate the steps to be 
taken to perform the actions. An example of PLANNER 
representation of a question is: 
(THGOAL (#ACCEPTABLE :SAM-THESIS) 
(THOSE EVALUATE)), 
which is the representation of the question "Is Sam's 
thesis acceptable?". Since PLANNER is actually as 
interpreter of the PLANNER language, processing consists 
of evaluating, in the sense of LISP EVAL, such PLANNER 
statements. 
PLANNER has a more sophisticated backup facility 
than LISP, which is very useful in theorem-proving. 
PLANNER has the ability to do backup in case of failure, 
and t'hat backup always goes to the last place where a 
decision of any kind was made. Thus if it is attempting 
to find an object in the data base which has two 
properties, it would attempt to use the statement 
(THAND (X) (THGOAL (PROPERTYl $?X)) 
(THGOAL (PROPERTY2 $?X))). 
Upon finding an object which has property 1, it will 
then see if that object has property 2. If not, it will 
back up to the first THGOAL and look for another object 
which has property 1, rather than returning NIL for the 
entire AND and resuming at the next statement the way 
LISP does. Similarly, backup is effective in THOR in 
the expected way. If the first member of the THOR 
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succeeds, the second is not tried, but if there is a 
failure further along on this path, PLANNER can back up. 
to the THOR and try the second. 
The system can keep track of events and states in 
the changing blocks world through its imperative 
representation. Since assertions may be true at one 
time and become false later, or vice versa, it is 
necessary to be able to remove and add them to the data 
base of assertions in order to keep the state of the 
blocks world up to date. This is handled very naturally 
by the use of ANTECEDENT theorems which may contain the 
imperative statements THERASE or THASSERT. 
3. Discussion 
SHRDLU understood a much larger subset of English 
grammar than did previous systems. Complicated 
embeddings of relative clauses used to identify a 
particular block in the world were correctly understood. 
It also represented a significant advance in 
inferencing. By representing propositional data in the 
form of procedures, the proof process had knowledge of 
both the available facts and how to use them for a 
proof. This, of course, was much more efficient than 
the resolution algorithm, which had to search, with no 
heuristic direction, the entire set of available 
propositions for one which might be applicable. 
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SHRDLU's advantage was in another sense a 
disadvantage if the system was to be extended to a 
domain wider than the blocks world. Its procedural 
representation for propositional data, in providing 
information on how the knowledge could be used, also 
limited the use of that knowle~ge to those purposes 
embodied in the procedures. In wider domains, the ways 
knowledge must be used are not so limited. For example, 
human understanders use knowledge not only to verify or 
discover facts about the world, but also to predict what 
kind of information or events may follow in a story. 
The procedural representation, while efficient and 
useful for formal deductive inference, was too limited 
for the type of inference that must be done in 
understanding stories or conversation. 
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III. MARGIE 
Most current natural language systems do not rely 
on formal deduction as the primary method of inference, 
indeed, many systems use no formal deduction at all. 
Instead, they use knowledge structures and inferencing 
techniques which allow faster, shallower inferences than 
deductive systems. 
[Schank and Rieger,1974] outline the differences 
between the kind of inference used in natural language 
understanding and the formal deduction which is more 
appropriate for problem-solving systems: 
1. Unlike deduction, inference generation is a 
reflex response to the input. It is not only done as 
needed, but is a constant process of making predictions 
and looking for.their fulfillment. This 
prediction/fulfillment model is a useful one. When we 
read a sentence, by predicting what we might see next, 
we can then see how the information in the following 
sentences fulfills or contradicts our prediction. In so 
doing, we have made explicit the meaning relationship 
among the sentences. 
2. Inferences are not necessarily logically valid. 
When we know that a certain action causes a certain 
state, we can infer from the presence of that state that 
the action has occurred (and change our mind later if 
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new facts contradict the inference) but we can not 
deduce it. 
3. As a result, inferences can be made which are 
not accurate. An inferencing system must allow for the 
possibility of erroneous inferences by providing a means 
of handling contradictions to facts it has inferred. 
4. Inference, unlike deduction, is not goal-
directed. With deduction, we try to determine if a 
given proposition is true; with inference, we are just 
looking to see what we can see and use those inferences 
as predictions of what may follow, so that the 
following information can be understood in terms of how 
it fits the prediction. 
This is all very different from the deduction in 
SHRDLU, where proofs for propositions were sought as 
needed through a strictly deductive theorem prover. 
5. With inference, we need to know why something is 
thought to be true. 
1. Knowledge representation -- Conceptual Dependency 
MARGIE's knowledge is represented in Conceptual 
Dependency. Conceptual Dependency is a structure for 
representing the meaning of a sentence which based on 
the theory that meaning can be represented in a 
language-free form which is indicates the concept 
conveyed by the sentence. Unlike the PLANNER 
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representation used in SHRDLU, CD is a strictly 
declarative way of representing knowledge. 
The basis of CD is its representation of events. 
Every event has four slots, which may or may not be 
filled at any given time. The slots are: an ACTOR, an ACT, an OBJECT of the action, and the DIRECTION in which 
the action is performed. 
These are twelve primitive ACTs: 
INGEST -- an animal actor takes something internally PROPEL a physical force is applied to an object body part moves 
an actor takes hold of an object 
MOVE -- a 
GRASP --
ATRANS transfer of an abstract relationship such as possession, ownership, or control PTRANS -- a physical change in the location of an object 
EXPEL -- expulsion of an object from an animal to the outside world CONC -- an actor thinks about an object MBUILD -- an actor builds new information from old ATTEND -- an animal directs sense organs toward an object 
SPEAK -- an animal produces sounds from its mouth MTRANS -- transfer of mental information 
Each ACT may have any or all of four cases: OBJECTIVE, RECIPIENT, DIRECTIVE, and INSTRUMENTAL. 
Real world objects are called PPs (picture 
producers). In addition to PPs, CD also has concepts 
representing times, locations, at tributes of objects (PAs) and attributes of actions ( AAs). 
In addition to events, CD may also represent the following relationships among ACTs, PPs, PAs, AAs, 
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times, and locations: a PP has a PA, a PP is an actor 
or an object of an action, two PPs represent recipient 
and donor within an action, direction of object within 
an action, causality, state change of objects, and 
possession of one PP by another PP. Each of these is 
represented in a CD network graph by a different symbol 
linking the cases involved. 
The most important feature of CD is that it is 
language-free: "John consumed the cake.", "John ate the 
cake.", and "The cake was eaten by John." all have the 
same CD representation. If a natural language sentence 
is first analyzed into CD (by a semantics-directed 
parser), the knowledge structure created can be matched 
against permanent or contextual knowledge structures in 
memory, also stored in CD, in order to use the knowledge 
for inference. 
To build a theory of inference, Schank and Rieger 
list the types of inferences that an understander must 
employ within the framework of the twelve primitive ACTs 
of Conceptual Dependency theory. By basing the 
inference types on a small set of primitives, they avoid 
the problem of needing a different inference type for 
each different verb. The inference types are: 
1. Linguistic Inference 
A word or syntactic construction implies the presence of 
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some unmentioned object. For example, the pres
ence of a 
tertain ACT may imply the presence o
f various 
participants in various case roles 
for the ACT. 
2. ACT Inference 
An actor and an object may occur with no ACT to
 connect 
them, but our knowledge indicates th
at the object has a 
normal function, so we infer that th
e object was used 
for that function. 
3. TRANS-enable Inference 
A TRANS ACT involving an object and its recipie
nt 
enables another ACT to take place. 
4. Result Inference 
We can infer the usual result of a 
TRANS ACT~ 
5. Object-affect Inference 
A physical ACT can be inferred to ha
ve a certain effect 
on an object. 
6. Belief-pattern Inference 
An ACT together with its inferred re
sults (from 4 .• and 
5.) often fit a belief pattern involving the 
usual 
reason for the ACT. 
7. Instrumental Inference 
~ach ACT has instrumental ACTs assoc
iated with it, that 
is, ACTs which are involved in its p
erformance: 
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INGEST PTRANS 
PROPEL MOVE, GRASP, PROPEL 
PTRANS MOVE, PROPEL 
ATRANS PTRANS, MTRANS, MOVE 
CONC -- MTRANS 
MTRANS -- MBUILD, SPEAK, ATTEND, MOVE 
MBUILD -- MTRANS 
EXPEL -- MOVE, PROPEL 
GRASP, SPEAK -- MOVE 
ATTEND -- sometimes MOVE, but usually none MOVE -- none 
8. Property Inference 
We can infer certain properties of objects (e.g., their 
existence) from their presence in a sentence and their 
performance of a given ACT. 
9. Sequential Inference 
Sentences in sequence may share a subject or 
proposition. When we read "John wants to join the army" 
and later "John is a pacifist", we may infer that the 
second sentence refutes the first. 
10. Causality Inference 
Sentences in sequence or connected with "and", together 
with our real-world knowledge that the first may 
possibly cause the second, may allow us to conclude 
causality. 
11. Backward Inference 
When an ACT occurs which normally requires a 
prerequisite ACT, we may infer the occurrence of the 
prerequisite ACT. 
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12. Intention Inference 
trom the performance of an ACT by an actor, we may infer 
that the actor intended for the results (from 4. and 5.) 
to occur and is pleased that they have occurred. 
2. Processing 
The inferencing component of MARGIE does all of the 
above kinds of inferences. The MARGIE system consists 
of three processes: conceptual analysis, memory, and 
generation. Inferencing is done in the first two: the 
third is for generating responses. 
Conceptual analysis has two phases. First, a 
Conceptual Dependency graph of the explicit meaning of 
the sentence is produced. Second, the analyzer 
initiates inferencing which extends the graph to include 
implicit information which is not dependent upon the 
context, but only upon the sentence itself. 
The function of memory is to take the conceptual 
analysis and generate probabilistic information about 
how it relates to knowledge previously stored. The 
predictions are of three forms: 1) predictions about 
causes, 2) predictions about results, and 3) predictions 
about future and past actions of characters. 
Predictions are stored as propositions in list 
positional form, with the predicate first, then the case 
slots. Each simple concept has an occurrence set, which 
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is a set of pointers to the propositions which contain 
instances of that concept. Propositions also have 
occurrence sets, so that propositions can be embedded in 
other propositions. Propositions also have the 
following characteristics: 
STRENGTH -- the credibility of the proposition, 
stored as value between 0 and 1. This is the 
probabilistic component of a proposition. 
MODE -- negations have mode = false. 
TRUTH -- current truth value of the proposition. 
REASONS -- other propositions used to infer this 
proposition. This gives the system the ability to 
explain its reasoning. 
OFFSPRING -- other propositions inferred in part 
from this proposition. 
RECENCY -- time of last access of this proposition. 
Memory performs the following inferencing tasks: 
1.) Establish referents of all concepts in the 
Conceptual Dependency graph. 
2.) Serve as a data bank and access mechanism for 
answering questions and processing proof requests. 
3.) Store the analyzed contents of the sentence. 
4.) Perform appropriateness checking on the 
implications of the input. 
5.) Generate inferences. Completatory inferences 
supply a candidate for missing information. Causal 
inferences relate the input to belief patterns in memory 
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in order to explain the reason for the input. Result 
inferences establish possible outcomes of actions given 
in the input. Some of these inferences may be elevated 
to predictions, which are inferences focussed on as 
noteworthy. 
6.) Maintain a record of inferencing and 
prediction, and discuss reasoning. This includes 
modifying STRENGTHS and MODES. 
7.) Answer "wh-" questions about the 
conceptualizations and inferences which it receives from 
the conceptual analyzer. 
For each new concept, memory receives a descriptive 
set, which is the set of propositions about that 
concept. For example, the conceptual analyzer, after 
building the conceptual dependency graph and doing its 
inferencing, sends the following to memory for the 
sentence "John hit Mary.": 
((CAUSE ((PROPEL Cl: {(ISA - #PERSON} (NAME -"JOHN"}} 
C2: {(ISA - #HAND) (PART - Cl}} 
Cl 
C3: {(ISA - #PERSON} (NAME -"MARY")} 
)) 
((PHYSCONT C2 C3)} ) 
(TIME -C4: {ISA - #TIME) (BEFORE - #NOW}}) ) 
The concepts in the graph are John, Mary, John's hand, 
and the time. After memory establishes the referents to 
the concepts, we have: 
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( ( CAUSE ( ( PROPEL #JOHN #C0001 #JOHN #MARY)) 
( (PHYSCONT #C000l #MARY)) 
(TIME - #C0002))) 
where C0001 represents John's hand and C0002 is the time 
of the event. The main proposition of this sentence is 
thus understood as "John propelled something (his hand) 
at Mary causing it to make physical contact with Mary. 11 
Before doing its inferencing, memory generates 
subpropositions, which are units of information conveyed 
directly by the conceptualization produced in conceptual 
analysis after referents are established. 
Subpropositions are of three types: 
1. ) Explicit focussed -- that the main event of the 
sentence occurred. In our example, this is the CAUSE 
proposition above. 
2.) Explicit peripheral -- that other stated events 
in the sentence occurred. In our example, the PROPEL 
and PHYSCONT propositions are peripheral. 
3.) Implicit -- that events not stated, but 
normally true, occurred. 11 A hand was moved." is and 
example of an implicit subproposi tion. 
Inferencing starts by assigning the main 
proposition (CAUSE in our example) a STRENGTH= 1, TRUTH 
= T, MODE= T, REASONS= T (means not inferred, but 
stated), and putting it on the inference list. Then the 
PROPEL and PHYS CONT inferences are given STRENGTH = 1, 
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TRUTH= T, MODE= T, and REASONS= the CAUSE 
proposition, and added to the inference list. 
Before 
inferring anything from PROPEL and PHYSCONT, m
emory 
infers more about CAUSE. Thus inferencing is 
done 
breadth-first. 
Inferred from the CAUSE ••• PROPEL ••• PHYSCON
T 
proposition is the possibility of a NEGCHANGE 
in the 
heal th of the person being hit. This is an ex
ample of a 
Result inference. This is done by using a pa
ttern in 
memory which states that such a combination CA
NCAUSE a 
negative change in health. Another inference
 is that 
John intended that result, which is an Intenti
on 
inference: 
((MLOC ((CANCAUSE ((NEGCHANGE #MARY #PSTATE)) ((POSCHANGE #JOHN #JOY}} )) 
C0001)) 
where C0001 is John's long-term memory. 
Memory always infers that actions are volitio
nal Unless 
this is contradicted. The meaning of this pa
ttern is 
that it was in John's long-term memory (MLOC) that 
hitting Mary CANCAUSE her pain and thus him joy. 
From the NEGCHANGE proposition, memory tries 
to 
determine the cause. In this case, the REASON
S for the 
NEGCHANGE give the cause. If the cause was n
ot present, 
memory would make a prediction that informatio
n about 
the cause will follow. Another inference from
 NEGCHANGE 
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involves a belief pattern that someone who has a 
NEGCHANGE will seek a POSCHANGE (remedy). This leads to 
several predictions about what Mary will do next (go to 
a doctor, take medicine, hit John back) • 
From the inference about John's volition, we try to 
infer a cause -- why it caused John joy for Mary to be 
hurt. A belief pattern in memory associates with this 
pattern the belief that such a person must have been 
angry. Thus this is a belief-pattern inference. It is 
further inferred that the cause of anger is something 
that Mary did to John. When no cause for this is found 
in memory, the system generates the response, "What did 
Mary do to John?", thus indicating the depth of its 
understanding. 
Notice that the inferencing need not be 
particularly deep (only three levels from the stated 
fact) in order to understand the sentence, even in terms 
of the goals of the actors. Shallow inference is a 
characteristic of natural language understanding. Time 
constraints prevent such systems from making the deep 
inferences needed in problem-solving systems. One 
expects the computer to take some time to solve a 
problem, but the response to "John hit Mary." is 
expected to be almost instantaneous. 
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3. Discussion 
MARGIE represented a significant improvement over 
previous systems. First, it embodied a theory of non-
deductive inference which more accurately models human 
understanding. Second, it demonstrated the usefulness 
of conceptual dependency as a language-free meaning 
representation language which could be applied to 
inference. Finally, it demonstrated that understanding 
is not so much syntax-based as inference-based. For 
example, syntactically incorrect sentences can be 
understood if the proper inferences are made. Consider 
"John his dog the bone gave.". While this sentence is 
incorrect syntactically, and thus syntax gives no clue 
as to who did the giving, we understand that John gave 
the bone to his dog, because we know that dogs like to 
get bones and people like to give bones to dogs. 
MARGIE's main shortcoming was its uncontrolled 
process of inferencing. Although the implementation of 
the system did place constraints on the depth of 
inferencing, in theory the inferences for each sentence 
could go on and on. When new sentences arrive, they 
cause more inferences, resulting in a combinatorial 
explosion. The problem is that MARGIE employed a very 
primitive theory of context -- the context of a new 
input sentence was the (possibly huge) set of inferences 
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generated by previous sentences. This was a direct 
result of the belief that inferences, unlike deductions, 
are not always goal-directed. MARGIE, however, produced 
inferences as though they were never goal-directed, that 
is, all inferences were made bottom-up from the input. 
The systems which follow represent attempts to add some 
control and direction to the inference process. 
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IV. SAM 
There have been two basic approaches to solving 
MARGIE's problem of uncontrolled inferences, both of 
which involve developing a theory of context among 
sentences which MARGIE did not have. The first approach 
incorporates high-level knowledge structures which 
control the inferencing process by specifying a context 
and providing predictions about how subsequent input 
might fit the context. The second focuses the 
inferencing on plans and goals which can explain the 
relationships between actions described in sentences. 
1. Knowledge Representation -- Scripts 
The first high-level knowledge structures used for 
inference control were scripts [Schank and 
Abelson,1977]. Scripts describe knowledge of everyday 
situations which human understanders often use to 
comprehend stories. This is especially useful in 
situations in which causal relationships between events 
are not stated explicitly because of the speaker's 
assumption that the understander has knowledge of the 
stereotypical relationships in the given situation. 
Scripts consist of a sequence of causally related 
events (and the causal relationships between them) which 
describe a well-known situation. Examples of such 
situations are going to a restaurant, which consists of 
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the events of finding a table, ordering, ea ting, and 
paying: and riding a bus, which consists of the events 
of boarding, paying, finding a seat, riding, and getting 
off. The characters in a script are said to fill 
various stereotyped roles in the script: the objects 
used by the characters are called props: and the places 
that occur in a script are called settings. Together, 
the roles, props, and settings of a script make up the 
script's variables. 
2. Processing 
The system SAM [Cullingford,1981] uses scripts to 
understand stories about everyday situations. SAM has 
three basic modules. The first is conceptual analysis, 
which is the translation of English language input 
sentences into Conceptual Dependency representation. 
The second resolves references to actors in a sentence 
by identifying them with roles in a script to which they 
were bound because of previous sentences, or if no role 
was previously bound to the actor, to determine into 
which role they fit. The third is the script applier, 
which locates new input in the data base of scripts, 
sets up predictions about what input is likely to 
follow, and instantiates the appropriate parts of 
scripts. The script applier is therefore the principal 
inferencing component of the system. 
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Since the script applier deals with the language-free CD representation of the input, the events in SAM's 
scripts are also in CD form. The basic idea behind the 
script applier is to match the CD patterns found in the input with CD patterns found in the scripts in order to determine which script applies and which event in the 
script is being referred to by the input. Once this is done, the variables can be bound according to pattern-
matching criteria involving the known characteristics of the actor, object, or place compared to the expected 
characteristics of the role, prop, or setting. 
Thus SAM, like MARGIE, uses predictions of what may follow in the story matched against what does follow in 
order to understand the meaning relationships between 
the thoughts. The difference is that SAM's predictions 
are embodied in the structure of the script, which 
contains information about what is how events fit 
together. Thus there need not be the kind of shot-in-
the-dark inferences generated by MARGIE in the hope that 
some may be useful predictions. 
The script applier first introduces the most 
inclusive script referred to in the story by matching a 
story event against script headers which are included in scripts to determine what story patterns should cause their instantiation. Subsequent inputs are recognized 
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as events in the script, again by pattern matching. As 
these inputs are recognized, the stript applier makes 
predictions about what information is likely to follow. 
When an input is not recognized in the script or by a 
prediction, the applier assumes that a new script is to 
be introduced, and again the most inclusive script is 
introduced, starting the cycle all over again. The 
instantiation of a new script does not usually mean the 
removal of an existing one, since the information in 
both may be useful in understanding. This requires that 
when a new script is brought in, roles and props must be 
matched with those of the old script. Thus related 
scripts have interfaces which relate their variables by 
function. 
As implied above, pattern matching is done in 
phases. First, the constant parts of the 
conceptualization for the input are matched against the 
constant parts of the pattern found in the script. 
script patterns may represent events in an already 
instantiated script, or if the pattern matching is being 
done in order to determine which script is to be 
instantiated, the pattern used will be a script header. 
This first phase is called the backbone match. The 
backbone match has four basic rules: 1) "literal• roles 
and fillers specified in the pattern must appear in the 
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input; 2) any extra roles and fillers in the input are 
ignored: 3) a dummy which appears more than once in a 
pattern must match the same thing from the input 
every time it appears: and 4) an empty slot in the input 
matches anything, unless the pattern uses the EXPLICIT 
tag to demand that a filler be present. 
In the second phase, a process called Rolefit 
receives from the first phase the candidates for 
variable bindings, and checks them for reasonableness. 
This is done by including with each variable a set of 
conceptual categories into which an object must fall in 
order to be bound to that variable. In addition, 
another process Rolemerge is used to determine whether 
values previously bound to variables may be bound to new 
variables. This process uses knowledge attached to the 
variables to see, for example, if a given actor may have 
two roles in a script, or whether these roles must be 
filled by two different actors. In the latter case, 
Rolemerge would return a matching failure if an attempt 
was made to bind an actor to a role when that actor was 
previously bound to an exclusive role. 
In order to do prediction, the events of a SAM 
script are grouped into episodes. For example, the 
episode "finding a seat" on a bus would consist of the 
events "see an empty seat", "go to it", and "sit down". 
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The prediction phase clears from active memory those episodes which occurred before the currently-matched event pattern, and brings into active memory those episodes containing event patterns predicted by the present one. This, of course, reduces the combinatorial explosion of inferences which plagued MARGIE. Another important inferencing task performed by SAM involves implied preconditions for scripts, episodes, and events. Whenever SAM finds that an event has taken place, or a script is to be instantiated, the preconditions for the event or the script are assumed -to be true unless otherwise indicated in memory. For example, upon finding that John went into the library, SAM assumes that the library is open. 
The event patterns in SAM scripts are the usual CD events, typically involving a primitive CD ACT with slots for case roles appropriate to the ACT. The script header patterns, which are used for script instantiation are somewhat different. Attached to each script header is a set of predictions about what should happen first in that script. Script header patterns are of four types, each of which is a complete conceptualization, not just a reference to an object. Thus scripts are instantiated by complete events, so that nJohn walked into a restaurant." will cause the RESTAURANT script to 
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be introduced, but "John walked past a restaurant." will 
not. Precondition headers involve a weak prediction 
that a script should be introduced because one of the 
preconditions for the script is mentioned in the story. 
For example, "John was hungry." is a PH for the 
RESTAURANT script. Instrumental headers commonly occur 
when the input refers to two or more scripts, one of 
which may be an instrument for the others. For example, 
the BUS script is instrumental to many scripts which 
require a change of locale. Locale headers cause 
scripts to be instantiated when an actor is found to be 
present in a given locale. For example, John's presence 
in a restaurant represents a strong prediction that 
RESTAURANT is to be instantiated. Direct headers have 
the strongest predictive value, and are thus the first 
patterns to be checked in a context. In a DH, the 
script situation (not just the locale) is mentioned 
directly in the story. 
3. Discussion 
SAM successfully understood stories dealing with 
stereotyped situations, thus demonstrating the 
appropriateness of scripts for this purpose. The script 
model proved to be an especially useful one in 
understanding newspaper stories, which usually involve 
situations in which the information provided fits into 
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well-defined categories. Scripts provided control of 
the prediction component necessary to successful non-
deductive inferencing, which led to a reduct ion in the 
number of useless inferences when compared to MARGIE' s 
bottom-up "shot-in-the-dark" inference generation. 
In the next two sections, we will discuss systems 
which use frames. Frames are high-level knowledge 
structures which afford the same efficiency in inference 
control as scripts. 
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V. GUS 
Another high-level knowledge structure used for 
inference in natural language systems is the frame 
[Minsky,1975]. Frames are of many forms, all of which 
involve two main ideas. First, a frame represents a 
form whose structure is known by its user in terms of 
slots to be filled. Second, a frame is instantiated 
only when needed, and may be discarded when no longer 
relevant. 
A system which uses frames to represent knowledge 
for inference is GUS [Bobrow et. al.,1977]. Unlike many 
of the other systems mentioned in this paper, which read 
and understand stories and then answer questions about 
them, GUS is a dialog system --it carries on a 
conversation with the human user. GUS acts like a 
travel agent. It asks questions of the client in order 
to schedule an airline flight. If the client needs 
flight information in order to make a decision, GUS will 
provide that information upon request. Thus although 
GUS attempts to maintain control of the dialog, there 
are times when the client may take over control. 
l. Knowledge representation -- Frames 
A frame instance in GUS consists of three parts: 
the name of the frame, which is only a mnemonic for 
programmers and is not used in processing~ a reference 
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to. a prototype frame: and its slots. Slots have slot-
names, fillers, and possibly attached procedures. An 
example prototype frame is the TRIP-SPECIFICATION frame, 
which contains slots for all the characteristics of a 
trip, such as departure time, arrival time, and flight 
number. In addition to the usual values, slot fillers 
may be other frames, or, for a prototype frame, a 
description constraining the fillers for the slots of 
any instance. ISA is used in a frame instance to 
specify what prototype it is an instance of. 
The procedures attached to the slots are for 
finding fillers and other types of reasoning. There are 
two types of attached procedures -- servants and demons. 
Servants are activated on demand. They are indicated in 
the slot by the directive TOFILL followed by a procedure 
name. Thus the procedure is being suggested by the 
frame as a possible way of filling the slot. Two 
standard servants are ASKCLIENT, which causes GUS to ask 
the client for information on how to fill the slot, and 
CREATEINSTANCE, which indicates that a new instance of a 
specified prototype should be created to fill the slot. 
Demons are activated automatically. Some slots 
have the directive WHENFILLED, followed by a procedure 
name. Thus this procedure is run when the slot is 
filled. For example, the DATE frame contains a slot for 
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DAYOFWEEK, which has a demon WHEN
FILLED COMPUTEDATE. 
T~is directs GUS, upon receiving t
he information "next 
Tuesday", to compute the month, d
ay, and year from 
contextual knowledge (e.g. knowledge of 
the current 
date and day). 
GUS uses several permanent knowle
dge structures. A 
stern dictionary contains a list of
 stems and idioms: 
together with morphological rules
, it is used to 
determine word meanings. A trans
ition network grammar 
is used for syntactic analysis. T
his is unlike MARGIE 
and SAM, whose parsing phase is se
mantics-driven rather 
than syntax-driven. A case-frame 
dictionary relates 
to each verb a set of semantic ca
ses. These slots are 
filled in during case-frame analy
sis. Thus frames are 
used in semantic analysis as well 
as in inference. 
Information about conversational p
atterns is stored in 
domain-specific frame forms. The
se relate words and 
phrases commonly used in conversa
tion to the domain of 
travel. For example, in "I want 
to go to Florida", the 
phrase "want to go" is interprete
d as a plan to take a 
trip, causing TRIP-SPECIFICATION 
to be instantiated: the 
agent of go is interpreted as the 
TRAVELLER in the TRIP-
SPECIFICATION: and FLORIDA is the 
DESTINATION. A dialog 
query map, which is a set of temp
lates for questions the 
system may ask, is used in genera
ting GUS's questions to 
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the client, and a flight description template, together 
with a data base containing the Official Airline Guide, 
is used to generate responses to the client's questions. 
Finally, of course, frames and attached procedures are 
used for the inference component of the system, and to 
direct the dialog. 
2. Processing 
GUS uses frames to direct the dialog by 
instantiating a top-level dialog frame. The system then 
goes through the slots of this frame in order, trying to 
find fillers. When a slot is filled by a new frame 
instance, the system immediately tries to fill the slots 
of the new instance. Thus slot-filling is ordinarily 
done depth-first through the hierarchy of frames. Since 
GUS is trying to fill slots, if ASKCLIENT is the servant 
for a slot, GUS maintains control of the conversation. 
Slots may be filled out of this depth-first sequence if 
the client volunteers information, or if attached 
procedures are called. 
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VI. ~ Malaprop 
Another system which uses frames is Ms. Malaprop 
[Charniak, 1978]. Ms. Malaprop is a system which reads 
stories about painting ( walls and houses, not pictures) 
and answers questions about them. Real-world knowledge 
in the domain of painting is crucial to understanding. 
The purpose of the system is to demonstrate a knowledge 
representation of events and causes in a specific 
domain, and to use that knowledge in making inferences 
in language understanding. 
1. Knowledge Representation -- Frames 
The goals of the knowledge re presentation are: 
1. ) Modularity -- if a process can occur in several 
domains (e.g. evaporation can occur in painting, but 
also in such domains as boiling and distillation), there 
should be a separate, single frame representation for 
that process rather than incorporating slightly 
different versions of the frame for the process into 
each of the domain frames. 
2.) Separation of worldly knowledge from control 
knowledge systems like PLANNER, which attach control 
knowledge to worldly knowledge, have the problem that 
the worldly knowledge can only be used in the way that 
the control knowledge directs. 
3.) Cleanliness -- frames should be precisely 
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defined with no procedural embedding. 
4.) Adaptability to problem-solving in a 
complex, problem-oriented domain (such as painting), 
language understanding may involve some problem-solving. 
The basic type of knowledge represented in Ms. 
Malaprop is how-to-do-it knowledge. The statements 
express states to be achieved rather than actions to 
perform. 
Objects used in painting are represented as 
variables, which are declared in frame form with value 
restrictions. Absolute restrictions specify conditions 
the values must meet. For example, the instrument used 
in painting must be solid. Normal restrictions specify 
.defaults. For example, the instrument is normally a 
paint brush. 
The process of painting itself is represented as a 
complex event. Complex events are similar to scripts. 
They have three main parts. The first part is the 
variable list, described above. The second part 
specifies the goal of the event and a name given to the 
goal. For example, the goal of painting is called 
PAINTING-GOAL, which is (PAINT coats OBJECT), where 
OBJECT is one of the variables. The third part is the 
event, which specifies the temporal sequence of states 
to be achieved in reaching the goal. The event may 
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contain selection and repetition o
f states. 
In addition, complex events have t
wo types of 
links. The COMES-FROM link, attac
hed to one of the 
states in the event part, is used 
to specify statements 
in other structures which indicate
 how the state may 
come to be achieved. For example,
 the state called 
PAINTING!, which is {OBJECT is clean) , in 
the PAINTING 
complex event, has a COMES-FROM li
nk to the goal of the 
complex event WASH. This goal is 
called WASH-GOAL and 
is ( WASH-OBJECT is clean) , where WASH-OBJEC
T is a 
variable which can be matched to t
he variable OBJECT in 
PAINTING. This, of course, limits
 the additivity of the 
knowledge representation, since in
 order to add a new 
complex event frame which uses ot
her frame modules to 
achieve its states, one would have
 to know the names of 
the statements used inside the oth
er frames. 
The LEADS-TO link is used to find 
a cause-effect 
relationship which can help in in
ferring the reasons for 
actions. In PAINTING, we have the
 state PAINTINGS, 
which is {NOT (STICKY-ON SOME-PAINT INSTRU
MENT}), which 
indicates the necessity of cleanin
g the brush after 
painting. This state is linked to
 a simple event called 
PAINT-DRY via a LEADS-TO link. A 
simple event expresses 
a single cause-effect relationship
 of the form (pre-
condition CAUSES condition) as its event 
part. A pre-
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condition of PAINT-DRY is PAINT-DRY!, which is (STICKY-
ON PAINT OBJECT). A resulting condition is PAINT-DRY4, 
which is (NOT (ABSORBENT OBJECT)). Note that PAINT-DRYl 
matches the negation of PAINTINGS. The LEADS-TO link 
thus allows the system to answer the question, "Why did 
he clean the brush?" with "Because if he didn't, it 
would no longer be absorbent.". 
State frames describe relations between given state 
and other states. For example, the LIQUID-IN state 
frame indicates that if an object is in liquid, then it 
is not in contact with the atmosphere. This helps in 
answering questions about why the painter might leave 
the brush in the paint when he takes a break. 
Another type of frame is the object frame. These 
describe physical objects. The object frame for PAINT-
BRUSH has heading PAINT-BRUSH OBJECT and contains 
variables BRUSH, BRISTLES, and HANDLE. The description 
part of the frame contains conditions on the variables 
which make it a paint brush. Examples are (SOLID 
HANDLE) and (PART-OF HANDLE BRUSH). There is also a 
LEADS-TO link in the PAINT-BRUSH frame to PAINTING-
BRUSH, which is (PAINT-BRUSH INSTRUMENT). This is one 
of the normal restrictions on the INSTRUMENT variable in 
the PAINTING complex event frame, and since it matches 
the heading of the PAINT-BRUSH frame, we infer that an 
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instrument which satisfies these conditions is a normal 
instrument for painting. 
Adjunct frames are used for specific examples of 
complex events. For example, the PAINTING complex event 
contains nothing which would make it specific to brush 
or roller painting. Instead, there are adjunct frames 
for each which fill in the specifics. Thus the ROLLER-
PAINTING adjunct frame has variables INSTRUMENT and 
TRAY. In this case, INSTRUMENT is normally a roller 
(something which satisfies the description in the ROLLER 
object frame). The MASTER for this adjunct frame is the 
PAINTING complex event. The event portion of the 
adjunct frame refers to statements in the master. For 
example, the statement 
(DURING PAINTING3 ROLLER-PAINTING!) 
with 
ROLLER-PAINTING! (FLUID-CONTAINMENT TRAY PAINT) 
indicates that in order to achieve PAINTING3, which is: 
(LOOP 
PAINTING4 (PAINT on INSTRUMENT) 
PAINTINGS (INSTRUMENT in contact with OBJECT) ) , 
if we are roller painting, the tray must contain fluid. 
Also 
PAINTING4 COMES-FROM: (ROLL3 (ROLL INSTRUMENT TRAY)) 
indicates that the way to achieve PAINTING4 (that there 
is some paint on the instrument), if we are roller 
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painting, is by rolling the instrument in the tray. 2. Processing 
Internally, a frame is stored as an atom with a property list of properties such as VARS, EVENT. Frame statements are stored as atoms also, with properties such as BODY and COMES-FROM. Frame statements are indexed according to predicates in which they appear, thus affording two-way linking of knowledge structures. As is implied by the word "frame", a complex event frame becomes active when it is mentioned in the story. Since stories are short, frames do not become inactive later, that is, unlike SAM, the system does not forget. Removing useless frames is something that would be 
necessary if stories were long, or if they changed 
situations often. The list of active complex event frames is called the context list. 
Likeliness is used when information indicating how a variable might be bound is received. This is done by classifying bindings as GOOD, BAD, SATISFACTORY, or POSSIBLE. A GOOD binding indicates that the variable had been previously bound to the object, or that none of the other three are applicable. A BAD binding is used when the variable had been previously bound to something else, or when none of the normal conditions on the 
variable are matched by the object. A SATISFACTORY 
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binding is given if there are no normal conditions and 
all of the absolute conditions are satisfied. A 
POSSIBLE binding is used if the only unsatisfied normal 
conditions deal with properties the object should have 
rather than with the type of object it should be. 
Ms. Malaprop does deductive read-time inferences of 
three types. Consistency inferences involve resolving 
contradictions. Whenever a new fact is added to the 
data base, the system checks to see if it is the 
negation of some fact already in the data base. If so, 
the system resolves the inconsistency by deleting either 
the original fact or the negation. If the original fact 
is deleted, the facts inferred from it may be incorrect. 
So Ms. Malaprop adds their negations to the data base in 
order to induce a new round of consistency inferencing. 
This process is repeated until all inconsistencies are 
removed. This is facilitated by the two-way linking of 
inferences -- when a fact is inferred from another, this 
is recorded on both sides. 
Unexpected situation inferences are made when 
something unexpected, according to the active frames, 
takes place. That is, the story gives information which 
does not fit into any slot. Since these are likely to 
lead to important facts, the system attempts to infer 
the consequences. 
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Now we will see an example of the third type of 
inference, a needed-fact inference. In order to prove 
the assertion (PHYS-OB PAINT-BRUSHl), the system looks 
at the state frame for PHYS-OB. This frame contains the 
relation 
(PHYS-OBl (PHYS-OB OB) 
!FF (OR 
PHYS-OB2 (SOLID OB) 
PHYS-OB3 (LIQUID OB) 
PHYS-OB4 (GAS OB)). 
Recall that PHYS-OBl, PHYS-OB2, PHYS-OB3, and PHYS-OB4 
are just names for the statements that follow them. 
Thus this relation states that something is a physical 
object iff it is a solid, liquid, or gas. The state 
frame for PHYS-OB also contains the line IF-NEEDED: 
((INFER-FROM PHYS-OBl)). This directs the system to use 
the rule PHYS-OBI to prove that something is a physical 
object. The system will now use the SOLID state frame 
(then the LIQUID and GAS state frames, if necessary) to 
try to prove (SOLID OB). The SOLID state frame has the 
variable SOL and the line IF-NEEDED: ((ISA-LINK SOL)). 
This directs the system to use the ISA link for the 
variable SOL, which is bound to OB, which is bound to 
PAINT-BRUSHl. Since PAINT-BRUSHl ISA PAINT-BRUSH and 
the PAINT-BRUSH object frame describes a paint brush as 
a solid, the assertion is proven. ISA is used here not 
as a predicate, but as a pointer to the most restricted 
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object type of the given object, so in the case of 
PAINT-BRUSHl, the ISA pointer stores PAINT-BRUSH. 
3. Discussion of Frames 
Frames make "explicit the meaning relationship 
among thoughts" by identifying thought as fillers of 
slots in frames which were instantiated by other 
thoughts. Charniak lists three reasons why frames are 
popular knowledge structures for inference in natural 
language understanding: 
1. Frames are a natural way to partition knowledge. 
By only bringing in the relevant frames, the 
combinatorial explosion of inferences is eliminated. 
2. Frames provide for the broad, shallow 
inferencing useful in understanding language. To 
understand language, we often need a broad knowledge of 
the aspects of a situation, but we seldom have to do the 
very deep sort of reasoning necessary in problem-
solving. For example, in understanding a story about a 
restaurant, we need to know about ordering from a menu, 
paying, tipping, seating, and a variety of other 
aspects, but we seldom have to make a deep inference 
about the motives of a waiter in wanting a tip (he needs 
a new car, or wants to take a vacation). Frames , 
ordinarily contain the former knowledge, but not the 
latter. 
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3. The representation is more natural than in 
deductive methods such as predicate calculus. For 
example, it is much easier to express type constrain
ts 
on variables. 
Frames and scripts are based on the frame 
comprehension hypothesis: that a major part of 
understanding is the matching of incoming information 
against framed knowledge of what normally occurs. Th
e 
problem with frames is that they are inadequate for 
understanding tasks in which the understander does no
t 
know what normally occurs, that is, when he is asked 
to 
understand a situation about which he knows nothing, 
and 
cannot therefore make reliable predictions. 
·s0 
VII. PAM 
PAM [Wilensky,1981] is was written to correct the 
inadequacy of the frame hypothesis for understanding 
situations about which the reader has no prior 
stereotypical knowledge. Human understanders realize 
that an event in a story is part of a plan that an actor 
is carrying out in order to meet a goal, even if they 
have never had such a goal or used such a plan. In 
addition to the plan/goal theor1 in [Schank and Abelson, 
1977], PAM is able to deal with plan/goal situations 
involving the following: 
1.) Goal subsumption -- A recurring goal may lead 
an actor to plan for all occurrences at the same time. 
2.) Goal conflict -- A character may have several 
goals which are in conflict with one another. 
3.) Goal competition -- Several characters may have 
goals which are in conflict with one another. 
4.) Goal concord -- Characters may have goals which 
coincide. 
1. Knowledge Representation -- Goal/plan rules 
PAM's knowledge base consists of knowledge about 
planning. PAM does not do planning, but it needs this 
knowledge to generate explanations of actions which 
appear to be goal-based. The planning knowledge is 
encoded in rules, which are stored as LISP atoms with 
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properties including conditions, actions, and 
suggestions. 
Conditions are predicates in CD form. These 
predicates indicate the conditions which must be found 
in the story in order for the rule to be applied. For 
example, the condition for HUNGER-RULE is that the CD 
representation of an event in the story matches the CD 
representation for "Xis hungry.", where Xis some actor 
in the story. 
Actions of a rule are used to indicate what should 
be done when the rule is applied. The actions for 
HUNGER-RULE direct the system to add a goal, a source of 
the goal, and a plan for attaining the goal to the 
knowledge. The goal role is filled with the "Satisfy-
hunger" goal for some planner. The source of the goal 
is the theme of having the hunger drive, and the plan 
role is left empty until input indicating how the actor 
intends to achieve the goal is found. 
Gaps in rule structures are filled by appealing to 
.the suggestions for the rule. Suggestions indicate the 
target gap to be filled, the place to look to fill it, 
and a possible rule to apply. Thus HUNGER-RULE contains 
a suggestion whose target is the plan role. This 
suggestion directs the system to focus on INPUT (the 
story, or information inferred from the story) to see 
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what the plan for satisfying hunger might be. The rule 
to apply to fill the gap is called a request. The 
request rule for this suggestion in HUNGER-RULE is 
SUITABLE-PLAN-RULE. The condition of SUITABLE-PLAN-RULE 
is SUITABLE-PLAN-PREDICATE, which examines a list of 
plan rules associated with a goal. Among the plan rules 
associated with the goal of hunger satisfaction is a 
rule called DO-RESTAURANT-PLAN-RULE. Thus if it is 
learned that an actor who is known to have a goal of 
satisfying hunger subsequently enters a restaurant, the 
system is able to identify this as part of a plan to 
attain a goal, and has thus explained the connection 
between the sentences. 
2. Processing 
PAM's inferencing component combines top-down 
predictive ability with bottom-up inferencing. The 
latter is necessary because PAM does not rely on the 
availability of a frame or script, since it a~tempts to 
understand new situations. We may note here that 
MARGIE's inferencing was primarily bottom-up, in that 
inferences were generated from the input to form a 
context. On the other hand, frame and script systems 
have inferencing which is primarily top-down, in that 
once a script or frame is chosen, predictions are made 
from that knowledge structure to form a context, and the 
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input is then matched against the predictions. PAM does 
inferencing in both directions. 
PAM processes an input according to the following 
algorithm. First, the predictive component determines 
if there is a prediction which is confirmed by the 
input. If there is, the prediction explains the input. 
If not, the bottom-up component takes over. This 
component attempts to draw inferences from the input, 
which are then checked against the predictions. When an 
inference is found that matches a prediction, the input 
and inferences made in explaining it are added to the 
story representation by a third component called the 
incorporation component. 
The interaction of these components, and how they 
use the knowledge structures described above can be seen 
by examining how PAM processes the story "John was 
hungry. He ate at a restaurant." When the inferencer 
receives the Conceptual Dependency representation of the 
first sentence, there are not yet any predictions which 
explain the input, so the predictive component turns 
over control to the bottom-up component. The CD form of 
the sentence matches the condition for HUNGER-RULE, i.e. 
that someone is hungry. The HUNGER-RULE action 
structure is then built in memory, with the roles 
PLANNER and PLAN left as gaps. The focus of the 
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suggestion for filling the PLANNER gap is the ACTOR of the CD form of the sentence. The request is FOCUS-REQ, which moves the focus into the target if the focus is not empty. The focus is already filled with JOHN, and so this gap is filled immediately. The bottom-up component then passes the structure back to the predictive component. Finding fulfillment of a prediction is implemented as determining if there is a request focussed on the input structure whose condition is met by the structure. There are some very general predictions in PAM before a story even starts so that the processing of the first sentence may terminate (inferencing terminates when a prediction has been confirmed). One such prediction is a request whose condition looks for a structure in the input that has a theme in it. The structure for HUNGER-RULE satisfies this condition, so this prediction is fulfilled, and the incorporation component attaches this structure to the story representation. 
The second sentence does not immediately fulfill the prediction of the first, i.e. that a plan for satisfy-hunger will be found, since the second sentence merely states an action. The bottom-up component finds 
a rule called DO-RESTAURANT-PLAN-RULE whose condition, that a person enters a restaurant script, is met by the 
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input. This rule has an action 
which creates a 
structure for a plan, DO-RESTAUR
ANT-PLAN, rather than 
for a goal as the first sentence
 does. The gaps of this 
plan are the PLANNER, which is f
illed in by using the 
request FOCUS-REQ with the focus being 
the CUSTOMER of 
the RESTAURANT script as it appe
ars in the input CD; the 
RESTAURANT, which is filled sim
ilarly, and the ACTIONS, 
which is used to specify the act
ual events and is thus 
filled with the entire CD input 
action. Now the 
predictive component finds that 
the request for the PLAN 
in HUNGER-RULE is focussed on in
put, where the structure 
for the restaurant plan is locat
ed. Furthermore, the 
request, SUITABLE-PLAN-RULE, has
 its condition met by 
this plan, since it is .one of th
e plans for satisfying 
hunger. Thus the incorporation 
component can attach the 
restaurant plan to the PLAN gap 
of the HUNGER-RULE, 
which means that the system has 
recognized the second 
sentence as a plan for attaining
 the goal of satisfying 
the condition stated in the firs
t. 
3. Discussion 
PAM was able to understand a var
iety of goal-based 
stories, even when the situation
 was one for which it 
had no framed knowledge. This w
as due to its knowledge 
of plans and goals embodied in i
ts rules, which can be 
applied in the absence of stereo
typical situations. 
56 
The problem with PAM was that its bottom-up 
inferencing, while restricted to inferences involving 
plans and goals, still led to a problem of uncontrolled, 
irrelevant inferences. The theory behind PAM was that 
the plans and goals of all actors should be constantly 
monitored. [Schank,1979] gives an example of a sentence 
in which PAM would, with a full body of planning 
knowledge, generate irrelevant inferences which a human 
understander would probably not bother to think about: 
"A small twin-engine airplane carrying federal marshals 
and a convicted murderer who was being transported to 
Leavenworth crashed during an emergency landing at 
O'Hare Airport yesterday." PAM would generate 
goal/plan inferences about the marshals, the murderer, 
the pilot, and maybe even the implicitly mentioned air 
controllers. The goal of the marshals is to transport 
the convict to prison, which a subsumption of the higher 
level goal of keeping a job, which they do to get money, 
~nd so on. These inferences are not really necessary to 
the understanding of the sentence, but are generated in 
an attempt to keep track of all goals and plans. 
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VIII. Commonsense Algorithmic Knowledge 
Like Ms. Malaprop, a system by [Rieger,1976] uses 
knowledge structures and processes which are adaptable 
to both problem-solving and language comprehension. 
Since our topic is not problem-solving, we will discuss 
only the knowledge structures and how they are used in 
language comprehension. 
1. Knowledge Representation -- Commonsense Algorithms 
The basis of the knowledge structure is commonsense 
algorithmic knowledge, which represents dynamic 
knowledge relating to actions, states, causality, and 
enablement. The events are classified as actions, 
states, statechanges, tendencies, and wants. An action 
is simply something an actor can do, such as grasp or 
strike. A state is an actorless world condition, such 
as (LOCATION JOHN HOME(JOHN)) which indicates that John 
is at his home. An example of a statechange is then 
(LOCATION JOHN HOME(JOHN) OFFICE(JOHN)) which indicates 
that John's location changes from his home to his 
office. A tendency is an actorless action which occurs 
whenever enabling conditions are satisfied, such as 
gravity. A want is a state or statechange which an 
actor desires. 
The commonsense algorithms also contain links 
between the events. Each of the links has restrictions 
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on the type of events it may connect. The links may 
represent causality, enablement, concurrency, iteration, 
gating, or intent. 
Causality links connect actions or tendencies to 
states or statechanges. A causality link may be one-
shot or continuous, indicating whether the action or 
tendency needs to be applied continuously in order to 
produce the state or statechange. Causality links of 
either type may also be gated, that is, there may be a 
set of states associated with the link which represent 
conditions which must be satisfied in order for the 
state or statechange to occur. By-product links may 
also be one-shot or continuous and gated or not gated. 
They are used to represerit states or statechanges which 
do not occur directly as a result of an action, but 
occur nonetheless. Thus the direct statechange a person 
experiences when reading is an increase in knowledge or 
pleasure, the by-product statechange may be tired eyes. 
State-coupling links express equivalence of states 
or statechanges with unspecified causality. These may 
also be gated. For example, in the presence of the 
states (ATTACHED w Z) and (MOVEABLE Z), the statechange 
(LOCATION w X Y) will be equivalent to the statechange 
(LOCATION z RS), where Rand S depend upon X and z. 
This allows the representation of the fact that when 
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John moves his arm, he also moves his hand. 
Threshold links express good continuation of a 
statechange to some desired level. Thus in the presence 
of the gating condition (FACING X Z), the action (WALK 
X) produces a statechange (LOCATION X LOC(X) Z). This 
is linked by a threshold link to the state (LOCATION X 
Z), showing that the continuation of the statechange 
will eventually produce the resulting state. 
Enablement links represent connection between 
actions or entire algorithms which may be viewed as 
primitive for some purpose, and states which are 
preconditions for those actions or algorithms. 
For language comprehension (as well as for problern-
solving), commonsense algorithms are organized in 
networks called causal selection networks. The 
representation is explicit rather than embedded in 
procedures so that causality and enablement can proceed 
in both directions. Each network represents one state 
or statechange concept. Each node of the network, 
organized as a tree, is a test for checking real-world 
knowledge or contextual knowledge in order to decide how 
to proceed. 
At the leaves of the tree are commonsense algorithm 
patterns for achieving the state or statechange which 
the network represents. These algorithms are called 
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approaches, and are of three types: abstract 
algorithms, mech~nism descriptions, and sequential 
abstract algorithms. 
Abstract algorithms are themselves divided into 
forms. The first is a causality link connecting an 
action to a statechange. The second consists of a 
tendency, with enablement links from states, connected 
by a causality link to a state or statechange. The last 
form of abstract algorithm is a state-coupling link. 
·The state or statechange at the bottom of each 
represents the goal state for the network. 
Mechanism descriptions represent internal cause-
effect relationships between events in a mechanism. A 
sequential abstract algorithm is a linear list of 
abstract algorithms stored when a plan is found which 
solves a problem, and recalled when the problem arises 
again. 
The gate conditions of the approaches may have 
recommendations, which are pointers to other abstract 
algorithms which contain those states or statechanges. 
The first time an algorithm is reached, a gating 
condition has no recommendations, so the network which 
has it as a goal must be traversed. Once this process 
has found the abstract algorithm for the gating 
condition, the two are linked, so that if the gating 
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condition is encountered again, the abstract algorithm 
producing it tan be found without traversing the ~etwork 
again. 
Networks or portions of networks can be bypassed in 
another way. Once a test is performed in one network, 
its result can be stored, allowing the test to be 
bypassed if it occurs again with no relevant 
statechanges between occurrences. This is done by 
adding a path from the test which precedes the given 
test to the test which is performed afterward whenever 
that result occurs. Since tests are shared among 
networks, this is done in every network in which that 
test occurs. The system then seeks the transitive 
closure of all these links, allowing it possibly to skip 
~ntire networks. 
2. Processing 
Causal selection networks are used for language 
understanding according to the prediction/fulfillment 
model of comprehension. The model can be made explicit 
as follows: given a context C(Tl), elucidate the 
relationship between it and the next thought T2. Call 
this the interpretation of T2 in this context, and 
denote it I(T2,C(Tl)). Tl is used to generate 
expectations (predictions) of actions and see how the 
subsequent thought T2 fits in. One way to do this is to 
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start with goals, which are expressed as wants of states 
or statechanges. Predicting the goals then amounts to 
identifying the tops of the causal selection networks as 
representing likely goals. The approaches at the bottom 
of the networks, together with their subgoals and 
recommended actions, then represent the realm of 
predicted actions. 
In order to do this, the idea of a causal selection 
network is adapted by defining two new types of 
networks: inducement networks and prediction networks. 
Inducement networks are used to discover what states 
some action or state might induce in a potential actor. 
These are similar to causal selection networks, except 
that at the leaves there is a set of internal states 
which might be induced. Thus each network represents 
and inducing action or state; traversing the network 
amounts to discovering what it might induce. As each 
thought enters, the appropriate network is traversed for 
each potential actor. The states that are discovered 
represent the input to the prediction networks. 
Prediction networks are used to discover the goals 
some internal state might cause an actor to have. At 
the leaves is the set of possible goals. Thus each 
prediction network represents a certain state in an 
actor; traversing the network amounts to discovering the 
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predicted goals of the actor. These goals are then 
input into causal selection networks, which discover 
actions from knowledge of goals. 
To bypass prediction networks and causal selection 
networks, inducement networks may contain 
recommendations of actions. This has the advantage of 
using not only the internal state of an actor for 
prediction (which is all that a prediction network has 
available), but also the action or state (available to 
an inducement network) which induced the internal state. . . 
Clearly, an actor's response to an internal state might 
well depend on what caused that state. To produce 
higher order inferences, the predicted goal states may 
be fed back into inducement networks to see what states 
they might cause. 
Having finished the prediction phase, which depends 
only upon the context, the system will then see how the 
input thought fulfills the predictions. Each input 
thought is matched with an abstract algorithm which may 
occur at the bottom of a causal selection network. The 
system then searches up the causal selection network 
hoping to find a goal in the prediction set. If one is 
found, I(T2,C(Tl)) has been determined. 
This upward traversal is done as follows. At each 
node, pose the test. If the test would have directed 
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the system to the node it came from below, keep going. 
If this does not happen several times in a path, try 
another path. When the top of a network is reached, if 
the goal represented by the network is in the prediction 
set, the system has understood how the new thought fits 
into the context. If not, the goal is considered a 
higher-level goal. The system looks for occurrences of 
it in abstract algorithms at the leaves of other 
networks, and then traverses up these, looking for 
something in the prediction set. 
This process stops when the number of networks 
traversed reaches a cutoff value. Anything beyond this 
level would be both a remote interpretation and 
expensive. If there is more than one interpretation, 
choose the one with the fewest networks traversed. In 
case of a tie, choose the one which fared better on the 
tests at each node. 
Bypassing tests may occur in two ways. First, 
recommendations are preferred over networks in climbing 
up. Second, bypasses may be implanted by climbing down 
again along the interpretation path. 
3. Discussion 
Abstract algorithms and causal selection networks 
are an efficient way of organizing knowledge for 
problem-solving and language comprehension. In language 
65 
comprehension, they are especially useful for stories 
involving goals and plans, in that the input is used to 
infer a state in an actor, which is in turn used to 
predict a goal the actor might have, which is then used 
to predict his actions by identifying them as part of a 
plan to achieve the predicted goal. 
As in PAM and MARGIE, much of the inferencing 
consists of bot tom-up prediction-making. While this 
gives the system the ability to work in situations in 
which it has no stereotypical knowledge, it also 
produces the problem of uncontrolled inferencing. The 
network system artificially controls the inferencing for 
efficiency purposes by restricting the number of 
networks traversed, just as MARGIE has artificial 
controls on the depth of its inferencing. The problem 
is that although there is probably a ~egative 
correlation between depth and relevance, that 
correlation is not necessarily -1, that is, there may 
be relevant inferences which can be obtained only by 
deeper inferencing than can many irrelevant ones. Thus 
in order to guarantee that all relevant inferences are 
generated for prediction, the depth may have to be set 
in such a way as to also generate the irrelevant ones. 
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IX. BORIS 
A system that uses a variety of knowledge structures 
for inference is BORIS. The story below, which BORIS 
understands in depth, is included as a source of 
examples for the following discussion of the system's 
knowledge structures and processes. 
Richard had not heard from his college 
roommate Paul for years. Richard had borrowed 
money from Paul which was never paid back. 
But now he had no idea to find his old friend. 
When a letter arrived from San Francisco, 
Richard was anxious to find out how Paul was. 
Unfortunately, the news was not good. 
Paul's wife Sarah wanted a divorce. She also 
wanted the car, the house, the children, and 
alimony. Paul wanted the divorce, but he did 
not want to see Sarah walk off with everything 
he had. His salary from the state school 
system was very small. Not knowing who to 
turn to, he ~as hoping for a favor from the 
only lawyer he knew. Paul gave his home phone 
number in case Richard could help. 
Richard eagerly picked up the phone and 
dialed. After a brief conversation, Paul 
agreed to have lunch with him the next day. 
He sounded extremely relieved and grateful. 
The next day, as Richard was driving to 
the restaurant, he barely avoided hitting an 
old man on the street. He felt extremely 
upset by the incident, and had three drinks at 
the restaurant. When Paul arrived, Richard 
was fairly drunk. After the food came, Richard 
spilled a cup of coffee on Paul. Paul seemed 
very annoyed by this, so Richard offered to 
drive him home for a change of clothes. 
When Paul walked into the bedroom and 
found Sarah with another man, he nearly had a 
heart attack. Then he realized what a blessing 
it was. With Richard there as a witness, 
Sarah's divorce case was shot. Richard 
congratulated Paul and suggested that they 
celebrate at dinner. Paul was eager to comply. 
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In order to understand this story in depth, BORIS 
deals with the following problems, which are not dealt 
with as effectively.in the other systems reported in 
this paper: 
1. Inferences must often be made from the absence 
of a fact or event. For example, from "John walked into 
the room and Mary was not there.", the system should 
infer that John wanted to see Mary, not just that Mary 
is somewhere other than in the room. 
2. Inference of motives of characters may need to 
use knowledge of the relationships between characters. 
Thus Richard's motive for helping Paul is understood by 
BORIS to be the desire to return Paul's favor of lending 
him money. 
3. Knowledge of human situations is needed for in-
depth inference. Examples of such situations in the 
story are divorce, borrowing and repayment, writing and 
receiving letters. 
4. Figures of speech need to be understood. When 
we read that Paul did not want to "see" his wife "walk 
off" with everything he had, we understand that "see" 
and "walk off" are not to be taken literally. 
5. Pronoun reference often requires knowledge and 
inference in addition to syntactic and semantic rules 
for resolution. 
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1. Knowledge representation --~ ~ ~ 
The main permanent knowledge structure which the 
parsing module examines is the dictionary. Each lexical 
item in the dictionary has associated knowledge 
structures and demons. Demons represent procedural 
knowledge: their purpose is to search and construct 
episodic memory. Demons may spawn other demons. Demons 
may be used to fill slots in knowledge structures, to 
determine character's plans and goals, to deal with 
settings, to deal with events, or to handle prediction 
fulfillment or violation. 
BORIS also uses a variety of knowledge structures 
which we have already seen, such as scripts, settings, 
and events, and two we have not seen, which are known as 
Memory Organization Packets (MOPs) and Thematic Affect 
Units (TAUs). The knowledge structures are associated 
with lexical items in the dictionary for instantiation, 
and are integrated by a set of links, as discussed 
below. 
A MOP is a configuration of Conceptual Dependency 
graphs formed into a discrete knowledge structure by a 
standard set of links. MOPs differ from scripts in that 
they focus on goals and intentions. For example, the 
MOP for borrowing and lending involves two objects, the 
BORROWER and the LENDER. The concepts in the MOP are: 
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WANT-OBJECT (BORROWER) ASK-FOR-OBJECT (BORROWER to LENDER) CONVINCED-TO-LEND (LENDER) GIVE-OBJECT (LENDER to BORROWER) WANT-TO-RETURN (BORROWER) WANT-RETURNED (LENDER) 
GIVE-OBJECT-BACK (BORROWER to LENDER). 
The concepts are connected by links representing 
intention (WANT-OBJECT and ASK-FOR-OBJECT), motivation 
(GIVE-OBJECT and WANT-RETURNED), or achievement (WANT-
OBJECT and GIVE-OBJECT or WANT-RETURNED and GIVE-OBJECT-
BACK). 
MOPs may be linked to other MOPs by MOP links. 
Examples of MOP links involving the borrowing and 
lending MOP would be links to FAVOR and BUSINESS-
CONTRACT. The links indicate under what conditions the 
MOP linked to should be instantiated. In this example, 
FAVOR is instantiated if the BORROWER and LENDER are 
friends, otherwise, BUSINESS-CONTRACT is used. The MOP 
links are necessarily uni-directional --the BORROWING 
and LENDING MOP is brought in when borrowing or lending 
is mentioned in the story, and since it is usually 
important to know the reason for the transaction, FAVOR 
may be brought in. However, when the story mentions a 
favor one character does for another, it is not 
necessary to bring in BORROWING and LENDING and all the 
other MOPs which may be interpreted as possibly 
involving favors. Indeed, in the story, Richard's 
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motivation for doing something for Paul is best 
interpreted in terms of FAVOR rather than BORROWING and 
LENDING. Even if the money had been paid back, in which 
case all of the motives and intentions represented in 
the BORROWING and LENDING MOP would have been achieved, 
Richard may still have considered the loan a favor. The 
FAVOR MOP would indicate that the normal desire to 
return a favor had not yet been satisfied, thus 
explaining Richard's motivation for doing something for 
Paul. 
The modularity of MOPs is also important. It would 
have been erroneous to represent the idea of favor 
directly in BORROWING and LENDING, because a loan could 
be a business contract having nothing to do with favors. 
Thus the idea of favor is brought in only if it is 
determined that the loan was probably done as a favor. 
Thus modularity helps prevent erroneous conclusions. 
Modularity also improves efficiency. For example, the 
DIVORCE MOP does not contain information about the legal 
aspects of divorce, instead, it has a MOP link to LEGAL-
DISPUTE. Furthermore, LEGAL-DISPUTE will not al ways be 
instantiated in the presence of DIVORCE. Additional 
information about the divorce, such as the presence of a 
lawyer, or an indication of a conflict in the goals of 
the husband and wife, is needed for LEGAL-DISPUTE to be 
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used with DIVORCE. 
When MOPs are linked, BORIS stores a specification 
of which component of one knowledge structure is 
equivalent to a component in another structure. For 
example, the LAWYER MOP contains a PETITION component, 
indicating that the lawyer petitions on someone's 
behalf. In our story, since Richard's agreement to 
petition on Paul's behalf is an attempt to return Paul's 
favor, this PETITION component is linked to the DO-
RETURN-FAVOR component of the FAVOR MOP. 
This again improves modularity. The PROF-SERVICE 
MOP, for example does not need to include information 
about legal representation or psychiatric analysis: 
instead, the LAWYER or PSYCHIATRIST MOP is linked to the 
PROF-SERVICE MOP with the corresponding components 
specified. This also allows several perspectives: for 
example, the system can view Richard's representation of 
Paul as a professional service and as a returned favor. 
TAUs are used to represent knowledge that deviates 
from a normal goal/plan model. TAUs have the following 
features: 
1. They are thematic -- they capture knowledge 
which people often represent in adages. 
2. They are affective -- they can represent such 
emotions as anxiety, upset, and shock. 
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3. They can explain variations from goal/plan 
situations: for example, they can explain surprising events that may cause a plan to go wrong. 
4. They are sensitive to points-of-view of different characters in a thematic situation. 
An example of a TAU used in the story about divorce is DIRE-STRAITS, which contains knowledge about how people react in a crisis. 
BORIS's episodic memory is therefore a collection of instantiations of high-level knowledge structures and the links between them. 
BORIS uses a single parsing module for reading the text and building episodic memory. Episodic memory contains the knowledge structures built up from the input so far. Therefore this module may also search previously-produced episodic memory to aid in the parsing task. This same module is used in guestion-
answering. Thus episodic memory units are created as well as searched while parsing questions. 
2. Processing 
As is the case with Conceptual-Dependency-based systems, parsing in BORIS is semantics-directed rather than syntax-directed. Syntactic information about each word is stored in the lexicon, along with conceptual structures and demons, and is consulted only when needed 
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for understanding. 
Episodic memory is searched during parsing to help 
to solve the following problems: 
1. Inferring roles -- BORIS can infer that in the 
sentence "The money was never paid back.", it means that 
it was not paid back by Richard to Paul. This inference 
is possible because of the recent instantiation of the 
BORROW MOP with Richard as borrower and Paul as lender. 
2. Pronoun resolution -- BORIS can infer that "He" 
in "He sounded extremely relieved and grateful." means 
Paul, because of the instantiation of the DIRE-STRAITS 
TAU. 
3. Disambiguation of words -- BORIS can infer that 
"hitting a man on the street" means hitting with his car 
rather than getting into fight, since ACCIDENT is 
available in episodic memory. 
3. Discussion 
As in PAM, knowledge may be applied bottom-up or 
top-down. One type of bottom-up application is the 
episodic memory creation from the input which is 
described above. Bottom-up application is also used in 
goal/plan processing, in which rules are used for 
monitoring goal conflicts, competition, and achievement. 
The conditions for these rules are events and situations 
(or non-events and non-situations), and the actions 
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involve filling slots in goal-oriented MOPs. A third 
type of bottom-up processing involves scenario-mapping. 
BORIS follows characters as they proceed from one 
location to another in a story. This is done because an 
actor's location may explain his action, or if his 
action is unusual in that location, this may explain 
another actor's surprise. 
Top-down knowledge application consists of 
fulfilling predictions by filling slots in high-level 
knowledge structures. Note the difference between BORIS 
and PAM in goal/plan processing. PAM creates goal/plan 
structures bottom-up from the input (by attaching plan 
rules to the PLAN component of goal rules), which, as 
[Schank,1979] points out, forces PAM to generate 
irrelevant inferences about the goals and plans of 
actors in the story, even if there is little chance that 
those inferences are needed. BORIS has pre-existing 
high-level plan/goal knowledge structures (MOPs) with 
rules that are used to fill their slots. With high-
level structures, BORIS controls goal/plan inferences by 
increasing the role of the predictive top-down 
component, allowing a corresponding decrease in the 
less controlled bottom-up inferencing. This eliminates 
many of the useless inferences generated by PAM, without 
sacrificing the ability to understand goals and plans. 
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